On 24 November 2009 the European Commission published its consultation paper on the EU 2020 strategy. This paper analyses European trade union responses, and contrasts the very limited participation in the exercise with the greater response to the Green Paper Modernising Labour Law three years earlier. It argues that a key explanation is growing trade union disenchantment with the evolution of the 2000 Lisbon Strategy -embraced remarkably uncritically at the time -as it developed over the subsequent decade. In effect, the neoliberal implications of European integration have become increasingly unencumbered by any pretence at a 'social dimension'. It is far from clear that trade unions have as yet a strategy to respond to the far harsher European policy environment.
Lisbon can be viewed as an inherently ambiguous set of incompatible policy objectives, pointing either to social regulation of market outcomes or to the hierarchical dominance of market over society. Such ambiguities were largely removed with the Commission's 2005 New Start, which in turn led logically to the EU 2020 initiative: the 'social dimension' to the strategy, always a subordinate element, was increasingly downgraded, with the priority of neoliberal market-making correspondingly highlighted. Broader attempts to engage 'civil society' in the policy agenda can be seen as purely cosmetic adjuncts to the growing technocratic character of EU decision-making.
A larger puzzle is therefore why the majority of European trade unions were for so long supportive of a project of European integration in which neoliberal aims predominated. After suggesting some explanations, I conclude by discussing the options for trade unions in responding to the challenges of a European political economy which is patently hostile to workers' rights.
Trade Unions and the EU 2020 Consultation
On 24 November 2009 the European Commission published its consultation paper on the EU 2020 strategy, with a deadline for responses of 15 January 2010. Evidently, these seven weeks included a holiday period; and the window of opportunity was even narrower for some countries -the Hungarian Economic and Social Council complained that it took over two weeks for the Commission to upload the consultation document in their own language. This timetable was widely criticised, and differed markedly from the four months allowed for consultation on the Green Paper Modernising Labour Law to Meet the Challenges of the 21st Century in 2006-07. Moreover, the Commission published its own, very complacent -indeed 'token' (Barbier 2011: 17) -evaluation of the outcomes of the original Lisbon strategy only after the deadline for replies. 2 For the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), an additional concern was that the very process of public online consultation was suspect, seemingly assigning equal weight to the views of private individuals and representative organisations, thereby undermining the privileged interlocutor role which the Treaties assign to 'management and labour' (the 'social partners') at European level.
In the event, there were some 1200 responses. Of these, 16 national and 10 supranational trade union organisations submitted comments, with a few others from union-related institutions as well as contributions from national bipartite or tripartite bodies in Austria, Hungary and the Netherlands, and the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC). 3 This may be contrasted with the replies from 50 national and 14 supranational trade union bodies to the Green Paper consultation. The unions and related organisations which responded to each consultation are listed in Table 1 . It can be seen that, apart from EU-level organisations, the EU 2020 respondents were predominantly from the Nordic and Germanic countries, with none from the new Member States. The pattern in the Green Paper consultation was similar, apart from a far more substantial response from British unions. 4 3 The Commission initially claimed -SEC(2010) 116 final -to have received 'well over 1500' responses. Its subsequent overview -SEC(2010) 246 final -stated that after eliminating duplication there were 'around 1400 contributions' including 45 from trade union organisations. These figures are well in excess of the total submissions included by the Commission in its detailed list of responses (http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/eu2020/contributions_en.htm). 4 (Broughton 2000) . In a resolution adopted in October, the Executive Committee declared that 'the ETUC agrees with the analysis ... Jacobs stated that the business community is "happy with this new momentum in the EU to tackle to high unemployment rates through economic and structural reforms"' (Broughton 2000) .
Though the ETUC in retrospect praised the 'balance' between economic, social and environmental goals in 2000, this balance was hardly obvious in the Lisbon text. Key themes embodied the economic and structural reforms which UNICE welcomed: a call for 'a regulatory climate conducive to investment, innovation and entrepreneurship'; 'a complete and fully operational internal market'; 'to speed up liberalisation in areas such as gas, electricity, postal services and transport'; 'to promote competition'; 'to make rapid progress on the long-standing proposals on takeover bids'; to 'redirect public expenditure towards increasing the relative importance of capital accumulation'. All these objectives contained threats to trade unions and their members. Central to the (far briefer) discussion of social objectives was the aim of 'modernising social protection', which has come to constitute 'one of the most prominent watchwords in EU policy discourse' (Hansen 2005: 36) . Modernisation is itself a deeply ambiguous goal, customarily a euphemism for cutbacks and privatisation. The specific labour market proposals, like the EES itself, were exclusively oriented to supply-side measures: whether 'more and better jobs' could be fostered without appropriate macroeconomic policies was simply ignored. One specific goal, increased employment in 'services, including personal services', might well be read as a call for more low-paid, low-quality, precarious jobs which are typical of this expanding sector.
The ETUC view of Lisbon thus seems to have reflected a measure of wishful thinking and a very one-sided reading of the policy. It was at odds with most academic assessments. According to Begg (2008: 429) , 'the remedy that underlies the Lisbon strategy is "structural reform", an expression that manages simultaneously to be ill-defined, obvious and accepted in most quarters as a "good thing". Yet it is also a source of contestation, implies losers as well as winners, and often has a delayed or uncertain pay-off'. Daly In defining its 10-year targets, the Lisbon Council envisaged a mid-term review of progress. In advance of this deadline, it commissioned two reports headed by former Dutch premier Wim Kok. 7 In his first report (2003: 11) he concluded that 'it is clear that, overall, Europe has a large gap to bridge to achieve the employment objectives set at Lisbon. Moreover, with the economic slowdown, unemployment has increased...'. The response, he argued, should involve 'increasing adaptability of workers and enterprises, attracting more people to the labour market, investing more and more effectively in human capital, ensuring effective implementation of reforms through better governance'. In effect, this reiterated the supply-side focus of Lisbon together with the 'structural reform' demanded by the employers' lobby. In the second report, in a section entitled 'unblocking the blockages', Kok (2004: 18) presented an analysis (Pochet 2010a ) which concluded that the proposals were 'weak and contradictory'. The strategy defined ambitious targets, but these could not be achieved if the SGP and the internal market were assigned priority. 'No reflection is given to the tensions or contradictions between the different aims'; these were 'camouflaged by "euro-jargon newspeak"'. Any concern with job quality had 'disappeared from the new strategy', a reflection of the subordination of social to economic rights. As a later and more elaborate critique insisted (ETUI 2011: 5), 'if the (macro)economics are wrong, all the other laudable targets and procedures in the Europe 2020 strategyraising education standards and R&D spending, reducing poverty -will prove entirely illusory, further undermining the credibility of Europe'.
In all these respects, the ETUC was clearly critical of the EU strategy, far more on the contrary, many of its judgments in the 1970s and 1980s extended workers' rights. But 'it is a Court which, especially as a result of enlargement, has changed its practices, its constituency and the problems it is confronted with', and in 2007-08 it 'executed a radical U-turn, from an approach based on worker protection to an approach based on freedom to provide services' (Kilpatrick 2009: 196, 208) . Hence in the Viking and Laval cases in 2007 it adopted the principle that, irrespective of national law, industrial action which interfered with freedom of movement or establishment was legitimate only if it satisfied a 'proportionality' test. There followed in 2008 the Rüffert and Luxembourg cases, which set very strict limits on the extent to which public authorities could prescribe minimum employment standards if these interfered with the freedom to provide services. Jurisprudence has become 'a mask for politics' (Scharpf 2010: 216) It is by now obvious that there is a self-reinforcing dynamic at the heart of European integration: intensified market liberalisation both follows from, and in turn reinforces, the subordination of social policy to the overriding priority of 'competitiveness'. Even the rhetoric of a social dimension has been marginalised: one symbolic change was the replacement of the Social Action
Programme in 2000 by a more passive Social Agenda. Cerny (1997: 251) has written that 'the transformation of the nation-state into a "competition state"
lies at the heart of political globalization ', adding (2007: 272-3) that 'rather than providing public goods or other services which cannot be efficiently provided by the market -in other words, rather than acting as a "decommodifying" agent where market efficiency fails -the state is drawn into promoting the commodification or marketization of its own activities and structures (including the internal fragmentation of the state itself) as well as promoting marketization more widely in both economic and ideological terms'. The Euro-state, never having been encumbered by the constraints of democratic legitimation which exists in individual nation-states, has faced few obstacles in its transformation into a supranational competition state. This process is central to the analysis of Höpner and Schäfer (2010) : it entails an increasing re-commodification of labour as national systems of social solidarity are eroded by marketisation, being reduced to what Streeck (2001) terms 'productivist-competitive solidarity'. Social protection is no longer an alternative to 'free' markets: it is an obstacle to market freedoms, unless it can be justified as a 'productive factor' which contributes to competitiveness.
'Instead of protecting people from the market, social policy is increasingly seen as helping them adjust to the market' (Hermann and Hofbauer 2007: 133) . The EU 2020 programme demonstrates how, within current EU governance, social policy has been reduced to a subsidiary component of economic policy (Streeck 2001: 27) . Hence it is entirely logical that, as noted above, DG ECFIN should increasingly take charge of the formulation of social policy; and the Lisbon strategy has encouraged a 'strengthening of the influence of the EcoFin Council', in parallel with the similar process within the Commission (Goetschy 2005: 74) .
'Part of the power of the neoliberal EU project has lain in its ability to close itself off from democratic influence and accountability, and to render its decisions and practices non-transparent and immune from mass pressure' (Storey 2008: 72) . The culmination (to date) has been the creation in October termed it, politburo -of the EU. 16 'It has no legal structure or secretariat, but it is now the core within Europe's core' ('Charlemagne' 2011); 'Europe is being run by a cabal' (Elliott 2011) .
As a response to complaints of a 'democratic deficit', the 'open method of coordination' (OMC) was invented in the 1990s, supposedly as a mechanism for broadening input into the decision-making process. In practice, it serves primarily to incorporate those affected in the implementation of policies which are already predetermined: 'OMC is subservient to the ideologies, 'the Commission should [normally] consult widely before proposing legislation and, wherever appropriate, publish consultation documents'.
17
From this followed the online consultation regime, which came to cover over 100 issues a year. Given the lack of discernible influence on policy outcomes, and the increasingly token character of the process, the inevitable result has been consultation fatigue, as declining trade union involvement clearly demonstrates. The ETUC is sucked into this process in part because of its dependence on 'borrowed resources'. 'Because national union movements in Europe were reluctant to allocate resources and to grant it significant opportunities to acquire capacities on its own, the ETUC had to seek its building materials elsewhere, from friendly, but self-interested, European institutional elites' (Martin and Ross 2001: 54) . Gobin (1997) and Wagner (2005) have charted in detail how this material dependence has constrained the ETUC's agenda and made comitology the line of least resistance.
More insidious, perhaps, is the subtle interaction between discourse, ideology and practice. All who are familiar with the Brussels process, whether as participants or as observers, have come to talk a strange language. They speak easily of horizontal objectives and open methods, of the social partners' route and co-decision, of macroeconomic dialogue and transposition. They can master a whole lexicon of acronyms. This is the world of Eurospeak! European integration has generated an organising discourse whichpresumably unintentionally -most effectively distances professional
Europeans from the citizenry of European states. To the extent that Eurospeak has become the working language of the ETUC (and national union representatives active within its structures), their logic of membership is undermined by the fact that they speak a different language from those they seek to represent. Not only different, but actually opposed: 'analysis of the official statements of the ETUC clearly shows a gradual integration of the employers' vocabulary and, increasingly, a vocabulary produced by the administrative apparatus of the Commission, at the expense of a vocabulary expressing traditional trade union demands' (Gobin 1997: 116) .
The consequence is a suppression of both political alternatives and mobilisation capacity. Throughout the long process of neoliberal marketmaking, most European unions have lacked the nerve or the capacity to offer unambiguous opposition, which in turn dilutes the logic of influence. Take two of the biggest issues of economic integration. Had unions had been prepared to campaign against the Single European Act, unless it gave labour social rights which matched the economic benefits for capital, they might not now be pleading for a -surely unattainable -'social progress clause'.
Likewise, 'despite judging the design of EMU as fundamentally flawed, the ETUC continued to back it, arguing that it was needed politically to keep integration going' (Martin and Ross 2001: 72) . Policies towards Lisbon and EU 2020 thus fit a longer pattern. 'Europe' has seemingly come to represent a value system and motivating ideology which has filled the vacuum left by the erosion of traditional trade union identities.
Has it become impossible to challenge frontally the dynamics of actually existing European integration? 'The ETUC offers renewed support for the internal market, but on condition that the new vision is socially and environmentally sustainable, leads to a strengthening of social welfare and the general interest, and promotes workers' rights, and fair working conditions.' 18 This composite resolution, adopted after publication of the final EU 2020 strategy, reveals a continued unwillingness to confront the reality that the internal market is weakening social welfare and undermining workers' rights and fair working conditions. has to mean a willingness to say no, shifting from social dialogue to the mobilisation of opposition to actually existing European integration. Though its leadership has now changed, the ETUC still seems determined to maintain the priority assigned to social dialogue -on an agenda defined by its opponents -with the mobilisation for an alternative restricted to token demonstrative action. This is to leave unambiguous opposition to actually existing Europeanisation to the political fringes, and in particular the xenophobic far right. Europe's workers deserve better.
